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1 Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia
“... there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new
order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done
well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well
under the new.” (Niccolo` Machiavelli, Il Principe, 1513/1514)
1. Introduction
In some policy areas, governments enact less reforms than seem to be desired by the general
public. Then, the problem is not so much, which policy is chosen, but rather, why a government
does not exert greater effort for any option, why a government does too little to change the status
quo. In may of these cases, interest groups are particularly influential. One prominent example
is the issue of access to medicines in developing countries: For at least the last decade, there has
been a pronounced public interest in political action.1 In spite of this, western governments have
been reluctant to take measures to alleviate the crisis. Only recently, we observe political efforts,
such as the Barcelona 2002 and Durban 2000 conferences on HIV/AIDS, or the announcement of
the Bush administration in January 2003 to increase spending for AIDS relief to 15 billion US$.
What are the reasons for such a lack of political action? Where are the “bottlenecks” in
the political process? This paper argues that the lack of political action is a consequence of the
structure of the political decision-making process. This process is composed of two stages: First,
in the policy choice stage, a strategy is defined. Then, in the policy implementation stage, the
government decides on the expenditures for this policy. When lobbies have political influence in
both stages, their failure to agree on a political strategy creates little incentive to support the
subsequent policy implementation. Then, the lobbies induce the government to reduce efforts to
implement that policy. An example for such a two-stage process are the United States House and
Senate: A policy is defined in the Committees concerned with the issue. Then, the Committees
on Appropriations decide on the expenditures for the new policy program.
The contribution of this paper is a new focus on the political process. First, in many countries,
lobbies are involved in the policy choice from a very early stage on. One reason is that lobbies are
1One example is the publicity that non-governmental initiatives gained when they criticized international
patent protection of pharmaceuticals under the Treaty on Intellectual Property Right Protection (TRIPs).
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sources of information. Yet, they are also considered as representing groups of citizens whose
interests should be reflected in a policy.2 Thus, a two-stage approach helps to draw a more
realistic picture of politics. Second and most importantly, a two-stage model shows structural
reasons for the failure of governments to implement new policies. In a standard lobbying model,
where the lobby’s objectives are exogenously given, reforms are delayed if the most influential
lobbies prefer the status quo. So far, the structure of political institutions has rarely been related
to lobbying. An exception is Persson (1998) who points to the strong link between the outcomes
of lobbying games and the political institutions which set the rules for lobbying.
By adding a policy-choice stage where the government invites lobbies to negotiate on a policy
compromise, this model endogenously derives the lobby’s objectives. The lobby’s utility from the
status quo then is only one determinant for the lobbying incentives in the policy implementation
stage. There are additional effects: The success of reforms depends not only on the influence of
its proponents and opponents but also on the chance for a compromise among the lobbies. This
is given by the characteristics of the policy issue: The ability of interest groups to compromise
depends on the relation of their status-quo bias (their opportunity costs of a policy change) to
the contestability of a political issue (the ex-ante maximal value of a compromise). The failure
to compromise can have detrimental consequences for policy implementation: The higher the
contestability of a policy issue, the lower the value of the policy compromise. This makes a
lobby disinterested in political reform, even if its status quo bias is relatively low. The policy
choice endogenizes the lobbying interests and provides a structural reason for government inertia.
This explains the reluctant government action for access to medicines, which involves highly
controversial issues such as patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
There are other explanations for a low level of government effort with respect to policy
implementation.3 Alesina and Drazen (1991) explain delays in budget stabilization measures
with a war of attrition among heterogenous groups in the society. In Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991), the uncertainty over gains and losses of a policy leads to a status-quo bias. Romer
(2003) argues that undesired policy outcomes can be the result of citizens’ errors in assessing
2In the German corporatist system, for example, this role of interest groups is explicitly acknowledged.
3For a survey over the main ideas, see Alesina (1994).
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the value of a policy. The argument closest to this paper is Coate and Morris (1999). In a
dynamic setting, they show that policy persistence results from lobbying as the lobbies first
adjust to the initial policy and then strive to retain the benefits from that policy.
Few papers analyze the process of policy choice. An exception are Epstein and Nitzan (2002)
where the policy choice is a contest between lobbies. Policy compromises are not possible.
Epstein and Nitzan (2004) show that lobbies might have the incentive to restrain themselves
in their policy suggestions in order to increase the chance that their approval is accepted. In
contrast to that, the present model proposes the view that interest groups have the incentive
not to compromise. This failure to agree then has consequences for the policy implementation
choice. Other models endogenize the policy choice by combining a citizen-candidate model with
the common agency approach of lobbying: Besley and Coate (2001) find that lobbying does not
restrict the equilibrium policy space as citizens may strategically choose candidates to offset the
lobby’s influence. In contrast, Felli and Merlo (2003) find that when the politician can define
the set of lobbies he bargains with, the equilibrium policy space is drawn towards the median.
The second-stage policy implementation choice uses the common agency approach (Bernheim
and Whinston (1986a,b), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), and Dixit, Grossman and Help-
man (1997)). As common in this literature, the present paper does not model elections. The
desire to be reelected is implicit in the government’s objective function. Grossman and Help-
man (1996) and Prat (2002a) include elections: Interest groups make campaign contributions
that the politician uses to influence the opinions of the partly uninformed voters. All these
models define the lobbying interests as exogenous to the political game, derived from economic
primitives. The policy issue that is the subject of lobbying is assumed exogenously.4
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) endogenize the effectiveness of lobbying by adding another
stage after the standard common agency lobbying game: Under political instability, the gov-
ernment may not stay in power long enough to implement the desired policy. When deciding
4Applications of the common agency framework are by now numerous. See, for example, Persson and Tabellini
(1994) for the provision of local public goods, and Rama and Tabellini (1998) for labor market politics. Aidt (1998)
analyzes environmental politics, Dixit (1996) and Marceau and Smart (2003) look at taxation issues. Kirchsteiger
and Prat (2001) theoretically and experimentally analyze inefficiencies that can arise in such lobbying games.
Drazen and Lima˜o (2003) show that it is optimal for the government to commit itself to a cap on transfers to
special interests when both the lobbies and the government have some bargaining power.
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on their lobbying expenditures, lobbies take this success probability of their political pressure
into account. Lobbies may thus exert less pressure in unstable environments. The present paper
seeks to endogenize the lobbies’ interest in lobbying by adding a stage before the standard lobby-
ing game: Interest groups have to agree on a political strategy. This compromise endogenously
shapes their lobbying interests. It seems plausible that the lobbying interest is influenced by the
choice of the political strategy itself.
Most lobbying models exogenously assume that symmetric lobbies lobby by contributions. An
exception are Le Breton and Salanie (2003) who show that smaller and heterogenous interest
groups are more influential. There, agents with a low stake in a policy change might decide not
to lobby and to free ride on the lobbying effort of others. In reality, lobbies also differ in their
access to resources and in their organizational form. To allow for variation among lobbies, this
paper introduces advertising as an additional lobbying channel. In most of the existing models of
political advertising, the government uses the contributions of interest groups to influence voting
decisions.5 Recently, efforts are made to combine the two lobbying channels. In Bennedsen and
Feldman (2003), lobbies can provide information and contributions to the government. An
information externality arises as unfavorable information makes lobbying by contributions more
expensive. Yu (2003) allows for political contributions and lobbying by advertising to the public.
Sikkink (1993) shows that civil rights movements can exert substantial pressure on governments
by influencing public opinion.6 The present paper suggests a way to formally model civil rights
movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs): NGOs can use advertising to shape
public opinion. The government reacts to the changed voter interests. As in Yu (2003), the
effectiveness of advertising depends on the degree of public awareness for an issue.
The theoretical development literature focusses mainly on the recipient countries of foreign
aid. It identifies the impacts of foreign aid on growth or democratization.7 Few authors analyze
5Among those are Austen-Smith (1987), Potters, Sloof, van Winden (1997), Coate (2001), Gersbach and
Liessem (2002), and Prat (2002b). Bennedsen and Feldman (2002) analyze informative lobbying to a multi-
member legislature. Baron (2003) models interest groups which advertise to the public through the news media.
6For the influence of public opinion on foreign policy see also Risse-Kappen (1991).
7Svensson (2000a) theoretically analyzes the impact of foreign aid on incentives for rent-seeking in recipient
countries. Concerning the impact of foreign aid on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa see Mosley (1996), for an
empirical survey see Burnside and Dollar (2000). Much of the literature about development assistance is empirical.
For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) identify reasons why governments grant foreign aid. Noel and Therien
(2000) explore the relation between political parties and foreign aid.
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the political decision on foreign aid in donor countries: Lahiri and Raimondos-Moeller (2000)
trace the allocation of foreign aid to recipient countries back to lobbying by ethnic groups in the
donor country. Svensson (2000b) considers commitment problems in donor countries. Mayer
and Raimondos-Moeller (2003) show how political support for foreign aid depends on the effects
of aid on the terms of trade between a donor and a recipient country. The present paper adds
to this literature by applying the two-stage lobbying approach to the political decision-making
process on foreign aid for the case of access to medicines.
In the next section, the model is described. The discussion of the results in section 3 highlights
the mechanisms at work in a political decision-making process. Section 4 introduces the lobbying
channel of advertising and discusses the results for that extension. In section 5, the theory is
linked to the case of access to medicines and some policy implications are formulated.
2. A two-stage political decision-making process
The model describes the two-stage structure of political decision-making processes. A po-
litical strategy has to be designed and later implemented. As an illustration, the model uses
the decision on foreign aid in donor countries.8 The model can also be applied to other pol-
icy areas where interest groups play an influential role. In the model, there are two interest
groups, the “Industry (I)” (pharmaceutical industry) and the “NGOs (N)” (non-governmental
organizations). Throughout the model, it is assumed that these two groups have managed to
overcome the problem of collective action (see Olson (1965)) and have organized into lobbies.
The rest of the population is not organized.9 For the second stage of the model, this assumption
is crucial if lobbying is to create distortions of the policy implementation level. If all groups
of the population were represented in interest groups, the lobbying outcome, if restricted to
truthful equilibria, would be socially efficient.
The time structure is as follows: In the first stage of the model, the lobbies take part in nego-
tiations with the government to define a political strategy. The government sets the framework
8Problems with policy implementation in the recipient country are not considered: Many aspects of this
complex problem lie in the developing and least developed countries. The issues there range from health-care over
the possibility to distribute drugs and ensure their correct use to the lack of financing possibilities.
9In the context of trade politics, Mitra (1999) and Magee (2002) endogenously model the formation of interest
groups.
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for the negotiations and requires the lobbies to find a compromise. Lobbies derive some utility
from the compromise. This policy compromise is taken as given in the second stage. There,
interest groups can influence the level of implementation for the new policy. In addition to their
utility from the new policy, lobbies have opportunity costs of the new policy: The “status-quo
bias” measures how much lobbies profited from the old policy that is to be replaced. These
two elements define the lobbying interest for the policy implementation stage. Players, their
strategies and payoffs are introduced in detail below.
2.1. The policy choice. In the first stage, both interest groups meet with the government to
negotiate on a political strategy. Instead of the standard way to model the lobbies’ objectives as
a function of the distance between the equilibrium policy and the lobby’s preferred policy, this
model abstracts from policy preferences. The decision variables Rk ∈ [0, 1], k ∈ {I,N}, measure
the “radicalness” of the lobbies in the negotiations. They do not describe the policy choices of
the lobbies but capture their propensity to agree or to disagree on a policy compromise. The
larger Rk, the less willing is the lobby to agree on a compromise. When there is more conflict
on an issue, the value of the final compromise is decreased. Taking part in the negotiations does
not create any direct costs for the lobbies, regardless of how radical they choose to be.
Incentives to be radical require that the lobbies have differing interests. Thus, all individuals
with the same preferences for a policy have to organize in one lobby. To understand the lobbies’
incentives to be radical in the negotiations, consider their internal organization: In the relation to
their members, pressure groups communicate their effort by the role they play in the negotiations.
The representatives of the interest groups thus have the incentive to take a radical position.
Furthermore, supporters or members of an interest group might have extreme preferences. If
pressure groups fully compromised their position, members would cease to support them.10
The bargaining on a political strategy is modelled by a simple mechanism. The government
creates a policy compromise which can be implemented in the second stage of the game. For
that, it uses the following rule: The government first designs a “maximal compromise”. This is
10So far, there is no model of such an internal organization of lobbies. Also in this paper, it is not explicitly
modelled. A model could be similar to the mechanism of “two-level games” proposed by Putnam (1988).
7 Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia
thought to include all possibly useful measures for a certain political goal. During the negoti-
ations, measures on which the interest groups are unable to agree are left out. The remaining
issues constitute the political strategy. This simple structure can be observed in real-world meet-
ings, where the government prepares a strategy-paper designed to incorporate all represented
interests. When the interest groups present their diverging views, the strategy-paper is reduced
(controversial points are left out) until an agreement can be reached.11 In such a setting, the
government plays no active role. Rather, it serves as an authority to set up rules for determining
the compromise. These rules define the interaction between the interest groups, just like the
rules of demand and price building on a market define the interaction of competing firms in
an oligopoly. The government’s role is deliberately kept passive as the model focusses on the
interaction between a policy compromise among lobbies and the level of policy implementation.
In the policy implementation stage, the government will actively pursue its own objectives.
The interest groups simultaneously choose the radicalness of their policy proposals Rk. Their
utilities from the policy compromise are described by
uk(RI , RN ) = Rk[τ − (RI +RN )] (1)
For the interest groups, the value of a policy compromise is defined by two elements: The first is
the ex-post value of compromise, after the controversial issues have been left out. The term in
square brackets shows how the value of the compromise decreases with more radical positions of
the two lobbies. Policy issues are characterized by different levels of conflict. Whereas agreement
is relatively easy in some areas, there are others where a compromise seems almost impossible.
The parameter τ ∈]0; 1] captures this difference of policy issues. It is given exogenously by the
characteristics of the political issue area and is equal for both lobbies. τ can be interpreted
as the ex-ante value of the maximal compromise the government sets up in its strategy paper.
It can also stand for the success probability of a compromise valued with 1. In areas where
compromise is relatively easy, τ is equal or near one (e.g. concerning more technical questions
such as tariffs). On the other hand, τ might be near zero when compromise seems very difficult
(e.g. concerning the international protection of intellectual property rights).
11For a description of such meetings in the Commission of the European Union, please refer to section 5.
Greenwood (1997) analyzes the characteristics of special interest politics in the European Union.
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Second, each lobby evaluates the value of the compromise outcome by the effort it has exerted
in the negotiations. The more radically a lobby acts in the negotiations, the higher it values
the resulting compromise. Put differently, the more effort a lobby exerts in the policy choice
stage, the higher is the probability that its own preferences are reflected in the compromise.
The strategic decision of the lobbies in the policy choice stage involves a trade-off: Lobbies
can increase the chance that the compromise reflects their interests by choosing more extreme
Rk. At the same time, they decrease the ex post value of the compromise. The trade-off for
the lobbies is expressed by multiplying the ex-post value of the compromise with the choice of
radicalness by each lobby Rk.12
2.2. The implementation choice. In the second stage, the interest groups pressure the gov-
ernment to implement the policy at their preferred level of implementation. There are no
further negotiations on the policy compromise. The implementation level of a policy describes
the amount of money or the effort the government devotes to the policy. It is captured by a
variable X, describing expenditures. The second stage is a two-period game of common agency,
as in Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001): In the
first period, the lobbies k = {I,N} simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose a contribution
schedule Ck(X) from a set C = [0;C] of feasible schedules. C is assumed such as to guarantee
interior solutions in equilibrium. The contribution schedules are assumed to be continuous and
differentiable in X. They constitute a binding promise of the lobby to pay a certain amount
of contributions in exchange for each feasible implementation level.13 In the second period, the
government chooses an implementation level X from a set X = [0;T ] of feasible implementation
levels, taking into account its own objectives and the contributions of the two lobbies. X is a
part of the total tax revenue T of the government. The rest of tax revenues T −X is spent on
12Another way to model the policy choice would be lobbying by information: Interest groups can supply
information to the government. However, lobbies have an incentive to overstate their messages. This leads to a
credibility problem. In most cases, there is no equilibrium with full information revelation. The more radical an
interest group, the more does the government discount its message. In contrast to the present model, opposite
biases of the lobbies are beneficial for the government as this allows to extract more information from the lobbies.
This requires an active government that seeks information to decide on its own policy preferences. See Grossman
and Helpman (2001), Chpt. 5. The present model does not focus on information transmission but on the role of
conflict or compromise in negotiations about political strategies.
13That lobbies are able to commit to their payment schedule is a common feature of all models of lobbying
with common agency. In a dynamic setting, the commitment could be created by reputation effects (Aidt (1998)).
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other policies. This section first discusses the strategies of the interest groups. Then, it sets up
the objective function of the government and describes the government’s strategy.
2.2.1. Lobbying by contributions. The lobbies influence the government by direct political contri-
butions. These can range from explicit bribery over providing lucrative positions for politicians
to donations to the government party. The contributions are of a private nature for the govern-
ment: They cannot be used to finance policy implementation, to lower taxes, or to be distributed
to the citizens. In the second stage, the each lobby k chooses its optimal contribution schedule
C∗k(X). The utility function of lobby k is given by
Uk = −Ck(X) + uk(RI , RN )X + sk(T −X) (2)
The trade-off for the lobbies in the policy implementation game is the following: Both lobbies
have to incur the costs of lobbying Ck. The first-stage utility uk(RI , RN ) from the policy
compromise lets them desire government effort for the implementation of that policy. On the
other hand, this means that the government diverts resources from another policy that has been
beneficial to the lobbies. The opportunity costs from a policy change reduce the value of the
new policy. The status-quo bias sk ∈ [0; τ24 ] describes the value of the old policy that is to be
replaced by the new compromise.14 This policy is financed out of the remaining tax revenue
T −X. sk measures how well the status-quo policy reflects the interest of a lobby: If sk is high,
the lobby receives high gains from the status-quo policy and is not very interested in changing
it. Generally, the sk do not have to be symmetric for both interest groups. For example, a
government could have been protecting the industry, so that I’s status-quo utility is very high,
whereas N’s is very low. The marginal utility of contributions for a lobby is given by
∂Uk
∂Ck
= 0⇔ pik ∂X(CI , CN )
∂Ck
= 1 (3)
pik = uk(RI , RN )−sk denotes the marginal lobbying interest in the implementation of the policy
compromise. It captures both the utility from the policy choice in stage one and the status quo
bias of the lobby. The left hand side of equation 3 shows the marginal utility for lobby k of
the change in X induced by a marginal increase in lobbying contributions. The marginal costs
14To scale the status-quo bias to the utility function of the lobbies, the upper bound to the exogenous utility
parameter is the highest possible first-stage gain τ
2
4
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of contributing are 1. When pik > 0, the lobby wants more government effort for that policy.
When pik < 0, the status-quo bias of the lobby outweighs the utility from the new policy and
the lobby tries to reduce the policy implementation level.
2.2.2. The government. In the policy implementation stage, the government chooses the expen-
ditures or effort X for the implementation of the new policy. The government’s objectives are
driven by the desire to be reelected. Elections are not explicitly modelled. Instead, it is assumed
that the government maximizes the utility of a representative voter. This could be the median
voter or the aggregate of all, in this case identical, voters. The implicit assumption is that the
challenger will also try to win elections by promising as much utility as possible to the voters.
Note that the model differs from the set-up in Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) and most
of the subsequent applications because the utilities of the lobbies do not enter the objective
function of the government. In this model, the government is not benevolent but maximizes a
reduced form of voters’ welfare. There are two reasons for this setup: First, model assesses how
the influence of lobbies distorts the policy implementation level away from the one desired by
the general public. The inclusion of the lobbies’ utility would distract from this point. Second
and most importantly, the model derives the lobbying interests for the implementation stage
endogenously from the negotiations on the policy choice. Thus, in a situation without lobbying,
it is unclear where the lobbies’ preferences should come from. When ex-ante preferences of the
interest groups have to be assumed, one important feature of the model is lost.
The general publics’ opinion is captured by the voters’ utility function:
V (X) = (Y − T ) + U(T −X) + a0αX (4)
with U(0) = 0, UX < 0 in X, and UXX < 0, continuous and twice differentiable. To ensure
internal and unique solutions for X, the following Inada conditions are imposed: limX→0UX =
0 and limX→TUX = −∞. The first part of the citizens’ aggregate utility is their private
consumption Y − T , where Y denotes total aggregate income. T is the total tax revenues of
the government and marks the upper bound for the expenditures for the new policy. All taxes
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that are not spent for the new policy are used for the status quo project. The utility from the
status-quo policies is denoted by U(T −X).15
The utility that voters get from an allocation of tax revenues to the new policy is given by
a0αX with a0 ∈ [0; 1] and α ∈]0; 1[.16 The expenditures (in the context of access to medicines,
foreign aid) for the new policy are discounted with α, the “altruism parameter”. Citizens value
these expenditures less than their private consumption. Welfare in the recipient country is not
part of this model. Typically, the altruism parameter will take a value well below 1. Surveys
suggest that citizens in industrialized countries would be willing to give at most 5% of their
income to foreign aid (Olsen, 2000). To apply this model to issues other than foreign aid, such
as environmental politics or consumer protection, the altruism parameter can be increased if
citizens are more directly affected by the policy. The parameter a0 describes the degree of
information on the need for the new policy. For now, it is given exogenously and remains
unchanged. In section 4, a0 is endogenized by giving the lobbies the possibility to advertise.
When there is no lobbying in stage two, the government decides on a level of implementation
called the no-lobby implementation level. It is useful to state the following preliminary result:
Lemma 1. When there is no lobbying, the government’s maximization problem has a unique
global maximum X∗nl.
X∗nl = argmaxV (X) = argmax[(Y − T ) + U(T −X) + a0αX] (5)
Proof. See appendix. 
When there is lobbying, the government cares about the political contributions from the
lobbies and about the utility of voters. With lobbying, the government maximizes
G({CI , CN}, X) =
∑
k=I,N
Ck(X) + V (X) (6)
15The model focusses on the shift of tax revenues from the status-quo to a new policy. Situations where the
government lowers or increases taxes are left out of the model. The model abstracts from voting or elections and
the mass of citizens does not lobby. Therefore, it is plausible to leave out decisions on the tax level, which would
directly affect private consumption and would therefore most likely influence the citizens’ voting behavior.
16More general functions for the utility from private consumption and government expenditures for the new
policy would be possible without changing the qualitative results. Then, however, a uniqueness of the results
would no longer hold for all cases. Therefore, the modelling choice is that of a linear specification of these parts
of the utility function.
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3. Lobbying by Contributions: Results
The equilibrium concept is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. It encompasses the two
stages policy choice and policy implementation. The model is solved by backward induction.
3.1. Stage two. The implementation decision of stage two is solved by the equilibrium of the
corresponding common agency game. As common in the literature, attention is restricted to
“truthful ” or “globally compensating” contribution schedules. A schedule Ck(X) is truthful,
if there exists a fixed utility level Uk such that C∗k(X) = max{Uk(X∗, C∗k) − Uk, 0}. The
lobby optimally chooses a target utility level Uk. The willingness to pay for a level of policy
implementation then is the lobby’s utility from the equilibrium implementation level net of this
target utility. 17 A truthful equilibrium of the policy implementation game is defined by a pair
of feasible optimal and truthful lobbying contribution schedules {C∗k(X)}, k = {I,N}, and of
the optimal implementation level X∗ such that X∗ the government’s best response to {C∗k(X)}
and, for each lobby k, the lobbying contribution C∗k(X) and the resulting implementation choice
by the government X∗ are a best response to the contribution schedule of the other lobby.
Proposition 1. For each a0 and α and each combination of {pik}, k = {I,N}, of the lobbies’
interests in policy implementation, there exists an equilibrium [X∗; {C∗k(X∗, Uk)}] with a unique
policy outcome X∗ and a set of truthful contribution schedules if and only if:
X∗ = argmaxG = argmax[
∑
k=I,N
C∗k + (Y − T ) + U(T −X) + a0αX] (7)
such that Uk(X∗, C∗k) = Uk where Uk is defined by
G(X∗; {C∗k(X∗, Uk)}) ≥ max
X∈X
G(X; (C∗I (X
∗, Uk); 0)); l 6= k (8)
Proof. See appendix. 
17As shown by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the restriction to truthful equilibria is especially attractive
because they are efficient in the sense that the outcome of such an equilibrium maximizes the sum of payoffs of
the players and because they are coalition-proof. Furthermore, Bernheim and Whinston have shown that each
lobby’s best-response correspondence to any strategies of the opponents contains a truthful strategy. This can
justify the restriction to truthful equilibria. Most models of special interest politics have used this concept of
truthful equilibria. Grossman and Helpman (2001) use the new term of “compensating contribution schedules”.
They distinguish between locally compensating contribution schedules which define only equilibrium behavior
and (globally) compensating contribution schedules which prescribe the same rule also for all out-of-equilibrium
contributions.
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When the lobbies have similar interests, the policy implementation level has some character-
istics of a public good: It then enters the utility function of both lobbies with the same sign and
there is no rivalry in consumption (the policy does not entail redistribution among the lobbies).
These mutual gains from policy implementation could induce the lobbies to free-ride on each
other’s lobbying contributions. In reality, this will not happen when each lobby has additional
benefits from lobbying such as reputation vis-a-vis the government and their members.18 In
the model, by restricting the strategy space to truthful contribution schedules, the possibility
of free-riding is excluded. Compensating contribution schedules reflect the lobby’s willingness
to pay for a policy change for all positive lobbying contributions. Formally, ∂Ck∂X = −
∂Uk
∂X
∂Uk
∂Ck
∀X
where Ck(X) > 0 given that the lobby reaches a fixed utility level Uk and Ck(X) = 0 otherwise.
To induce the lobby to participate in the lobbying game, Uk has to be higher than the lobby
could achieve without participating.19
3.2. Stage one. In stage one, the political strategy is defined. The policy compromise is given
by the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game where both lobbies simultaneously choose
their radicalness Rk. It is a pair of feasible mutually optimal choices (ReI , R
e
N ).
Proposition 2. For given τ and sk there is a unique policy equilibrium (ReI , R
e
N ) if and only if:
Rek = argmax[−C∗k(X∗) +Rk[τ − (RI +RN )]X∗(CI , CN ) + sk(T −X∗)] (9)
Proof. See appendix. 
The equilibrium is symmetric: τ is a characteristic of the policy and is equal for both lobbies.
The resulting policy is a weak compromise. The two lobbies are not able to internalize the
external effects their choice has on the utility of their competitor. From the policy choice, each
18Some readers may wonder whether a situation where lobbies have the same interests is of any relevance.
The issue of free riding might arise when lobbies see that others lobby for the same cause. In the models of
common agency, this is excluded by the focus on truthful equilibria. Empirically, Gawande (1997) shows that the
interaction between similar lobbies is the most important factor in determining lobbying expenditures.
19For example, for lobby I with piI > 0, this means that CI(X) = piI(X − X∗N ) ∀X > X∗N and 0 otherwise.
X∗N denotes the equilibrium policy choice when only the NGOs are lobbying. The industry’s utility level would
then by UI(X) = −piI(X −X∗N ) + piIX = piX∗N and the industry would exactly be indifferent between lobbying
and staying out of the lobbying game. For UI(X) = piX
∗
N +  with  > 0, the industry would strictly prefer to
lobby. In contrast to that standard result, Le Breton and Salanie (2003) show that free-riding can occur under
asymmetric information over the politician’s sensitivity to political contributions.
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lobby gets the utility uek(
τ
3 ,
τ
3 ) =
τ2
9 . The chance to represent own interests in the policy choice
makes each lobby act radically in the negotiations. This reduces the value of the compromise.
The utilities from the policy compromise depend on the contestability of a political issue τ .
This is common knowledge. The easier a compromise, the larger τ , the higher are the gains
from such a compromise for the lobbies, even though they then also choose to be even more
radical. Note that a decrease in τ also leads the lobbies to act less radically as they anticipate
the lower possibility of compromise. There may be situations where a change in the political or
public environment increases of reduces the value of τ for a given policy issue. For example, τ
might increase when a controversial issue is publicly discussed (see section 5). The gains from
compromise decrease with lower τ :
Lemma 2. The lower the chance for a compromise τ , the more often does the status-quo bias
outweigh the first-stage utility from a policy compromise and the more often is pik < 0.
Proof. The equilibrium policy proposals Rek =
τ
3 are increasing with τ . The gains from a new
policy compromise pik are increasing with higher Rek. For lower τ , uk(RI , RN ) is decreasing.
Thus, the smaller is the range of sk ≥ 0 for which pik are positive. 
Is there a chance to have a stronger policy compromise? The pressure groups could improve
their gains from the first stage by agreeing on advance on more compromising policy suggestions
Rck. This “collusion” would lead them to maximize:
maxRI ;RN [(RI +RN )[τ − (RI +RN )]] (10)
If they succeed in the collusion, they both act less radically: RcI = R
c
N =
τ
4 . This gives them
a utility of uck(
τ
4 ,
τ
4 ) =
τ2
8 which is larger than the equilibrium gains. However, this outcome,
although favorable for both, is not implementable:
Lemma 3. The “collusion” policy proposals Rck are not sustainable. Ceteris paribus, there
always is an incentive to deviate in the policy choice game.
Proof. This follows directly from the reaction functions in the policy choice game. 
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The overall marginal interest in government action for the new policy compromise is deter-
mined not only by the first-stage utilities but also by the status-quo biases of the lobbies. By
relating the status-quo biases of the lobbies to the first-stage utilities which are defined by the
possibility of compromise τ , different categories of policy issues can be defined:
Lemma 4. The status-quo bias of the lobbies determines the marginal interest in government
action for the new policy:
• In Case 1, when sk ≥ τ28 , pijk ≤ 0, j ∈ {c, e}
• In Case 2, when τ29 < sk < τ
2
8 , pi
e
k < 0 while pi
c
k > 0
• In Case 3, sk ≤ τ29 , pijk ≥ 0, j ∈ {c, e}.
Proof. This follows directly from the utility functions of the lobby groups. 
The gains from a policy compromise do not have to be symmetric: Depending on the respective
values of sI and sN , one lobby might benefit from a new policy whereas the other suffers. Note
that the lobbies will in equilibrium not stay away from the policy choice game, even if pik < 0.
Staying away (Rk = 0) leaves them with uk(0) = 0. As the are no costs, participating in the
first stage policy negotiations can only increase the lobbies’ utilities.
3.3. Results of the two-stage game. It is now possible to combine the two stages to the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium solving the political decision-making game.
Proposition 3. For each parameter constellation , there exists an equilibrium of the political
decision-making game with a unique pair of negotiation effort choices (ReI , R
e
N ), a unique policy
implementation level X∗, and a set of truthful lobbying contribution schedules {C∗k(X∗, Uk)},
k = {I,N} fulfilling the conditions of propositions 2 and 1.
Proof. The proof follows from Propositions 1 and 2. 
The outcome shows that the quality of a policy compromise and the utilities lobbies derive
from this compromise directly affect the level of implementation of a policy. The main purpose
of this model is to point to this link between the two stages of a political decision-making pro-
cess. Both stages have their own determinants of strategic action by the agents. The process
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of negotiating a political strategy on the one hand and the decision on a level of policy imple-
mentation have so far been treated separately. Nonetheless, there is an important connection
between the two: When the interest groups decide on their effort level in the second stage, they
are guided by the utilities they expect from the policy compromise reached in stage one. In ad-
dition, the status-quo bias of the lobbies plays an important role. In particular for weak policy
compromises it may outweigh the positive interests in government action for a new policy. Once
the link between the two stages is defined, a look at the consequences of different outcomes of
the policy choice game helps to answer the questions posed in the beginning: Why are there
policy areas where a low level of government action is observed? In particular, why have gov-
ernments so far shown only limited action in the issue of access to medicines? For a wide range
of policy characteristics, the inclusion of lobbies in the political process leads to a reduced level
of policy implementation. For notation, let X∗e be the implementation level following from the
equilibrium policy proposals Rek and gains pi
e
k and X
∗
c the implementation level following from
the first-stage collusion proposals Rck and gains pi
c
k.
Proposition 4. The inclusion of lobbies in the political process leads to reduced levels of policy
implementation if and only if
∑
k=I,N pik < 0. This depends on the category of the policy issue:
• Case 1: If ∑k sk ≥ τ24 , X∗e < X∗c < X∗nl
• Case 2: If 2τ29 <
∑
k sk <
τ2
4 , X
∗
e < X
∗
nl < X
∗
c
• Case 3: If ∑k sk ≤ 2τ29 , X∗nl < X∗e < X∗c
Proof. See appendix. 
In the first stage, lobbies act more radically than if they could agree on a compromise in
advance. This reduces their interest in lobbying in the policy implementation stage. In turn,
this induces the government to devote less effort to the implementation of such a policy than
would be possible under a more encompassing compromise. Thus, it is always true thatX∗e < X∗c .
How does the outcome differ from the situation where the government alone decides on the
level of implementation? Whether the implementation level X∗e is larger or smaller than the
no-lobby level X∗nl, depends on the relation of the status-quo biases sk and the potential of
compromise τ for a policy issue (see lemma 4 and 2). The higher sk, the lower are a lobby’s
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marginal interests pik in the new policy. When their sum is negative, lobbying leads to a reduced
level of implementation of the new policy. This is in line with the observation that policies which
reduce advantages for certain groups encounter more difficulties in implementation. Depending
on the policy issue, the inclusion of lobbies in the first stage of the political process can increase
or decrease government action for the new policy compromise. If lobbying interests differ,
sgn[piI ] 6= sgn[piN ], the difference of their absolute values (|piI | − |piN |) determines whether the
implementation level is increased or decreased (see proof of proposition 4).
The model points to the relation of the status-quo bias to the possibility of reaching substantial
agreements on a political strategy: Especially when the policy compromise is weak, a large weight
is given to the status-quo biases of the lobbies. Then, it is more likely that they will lobby for
lower government action for the new policy. Lemma 2 shows that a lower τ translates directly
into the equilibrium implementation levels: When an encompassing compromise is impossible τ ,
the cases 1 and 2 are more frequent. Lobbies then oppose the implementation of the new policy,
even when they have relatively low opportunity costs. In the other extreme, for high values of
τ , even high status-quo utility levels - showing a low interest in policy change - are sufficient to
induce lobbies to promote the implementation of a new policy.
4. Lobbying by Advertising
4.1. Asymmetric lobbying channels. So far, both lobbies were equally effective in influenc-
ing the policy outcome. This assumption is now relaxed as an additional lobbying channel,
lobbying by advertising, is introduced. This can capture the difference between “classical” lob-
bies and NGOs. The latter might not have the financial resources to exert direct lobbying
pressure. Also, their civil rights’ origin creates some ideological barriers to lobbying (see section
5). NGOs thus use the lobbying expenditures CN (X) to directly influence public opinion.20
In the model, voters have some interest in the implementation of the policy compromise.
However, they may be unaware of the need for this policy. Only a fraction a0 of the population
is informed ex-ante and is aware of the need for government action for the new policy. The
lobby can advertise to increase the proportion of informed citizens. The lobbies do not have
20Grossman and Helpman (1999) give a rational for advertising directly to the public: Citizens may lack
important information and the costs of gathering information may be prohibitively high.
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the possibility to convince ex-ante informed voters that they do not derive utility from the new
policy. It is impossible to reduce information among the citizens.21 While in reality, there might
be some scope for persuasion, it is plausible that advertising contrary to the truth at least is
more costly for a lobby. A lot of effort is required to make the advertising messages convincing
when they are not backed by facts.
To keep the model simple, it is assumed that citizens believe the messages from the lobbies
as long as they state that there is a need of government action for the new policy. In contrast,
when a lobby tries to persuade the voters that there is no or less need for the new policy, the
messages are ignored. Such a behavior would result from Bayesian updating by the voters in
the presence of uncertainty over the true state of the world.22 Here, this process is substituted
by a simple influence function: It is assumed that citizens can be either fully informed or fully
uninformed. Informed citizens are aware of the need of government effort X for the compromise
policy. For the uninformed part of the population, an expenditure of X just means that their
utility from the status-quo policies U(T − X) is reduced. The lobby changes the proportion
of informed citizens by using its lobbying contributions Ck(X) to advertise. The fraction of
informed citizens is
a(Ck(X)) = a0 + a1Ck(X); a(Ck(X)) ∈ [0; 1] (11)
where a0 ∈]0, 1] is the fraction of citizens who are informed ex-ante and a1 ∈]0, 1] is the effec-
tiveness of advertising effort. The co-domain of a(Ck(X)) is: a(0) = a0 and a(Ck(X)) = 1.
When pik > 0, an interest groups uses advertising in order to increase the proportion of
informed citizens. It then has a positive interest in policy implementation. When pik < 0, the
lobby would like to see less government effort for that policy. Then, it cannot use advertising as
it is impossible to decrease the number of citizens that are aware of the need for the new policy.
21In most of the political advertising models, lobbies can only partially manipulate information. They act
as advocates of their cause, that is, they reveal only information favorable to then and withhold unfavorable
information (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1999)). Baron (2003) and Bennedsen and Feldman (2003) use a similar
restriction. In contrast, some models, e.g. Bloch and Manceau (1999), of persuasive advertising have that firms
can change the consumers’ preference rankings over several products. In the political advertising literature, Yu
(2003) is the only one to use influence functions that allow for persuasion without constraints. There, however,
influence functions are assumed exogenously.
22For such a setup, see Grossman and Helpman (2001), Chpt. 6: Lobbies use messages to “educate voters”.
The voters are able to assess the credibility of the messages and update their beliefs accordingly.
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Two other scenarios are then possible: Either the lobby resorts to direct contributions. Then,
we are back to the analysis of section 3. If the NGOs, due to external constraints, are not able to
use direct contributions, they stay out of the lobbying game whenever piN < 0. Then, the policy
outcome X∗I is determined by the lobbying game between the government and the industry.
23
The NGOs’ utility from the policy implementation stage is then UN = piNX∗I . In the following,
it is assumed that the NGOs advertise whenever piN > 0 and refrain from lobbying otherwise.
In the asymmetric case where the NGOs lobby by advertising and the industry lobbies by direct
contributions, the contributions of the NGOs directly influence the utility of the voters. The
government’s objective function can then be written as
G({Ck}, X) = CI(X) + VN (X,CN (X)) = CI(X) + (Y − T ) + U(T −X) + a(CN (X))αX (12)
where VN (X) describes the utility of the voters after the NGOs have advertised. To see how
exactly advertising changes the utility of voters, consider the slope of VN (X) for piN > 0:
∂VN (X,CN (X))
∂X
=
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α+ a1αC∗N (X) + a1α
∂C∗N (X)
∂X
X (13)
In addition to the marginal utility from the status-quo policy ∂U(T−X)∂X and the marginal utility
increase of the ex-ante informed voters a0α, lobbying by advertising has two effects: First, the
fraction of informed voters is increased from a0 to a0+a1C∗N (X). These voters receive the mar-
ginal utility α from an increase in X. The second effect, a1α
∂C∗N (X)
∂X X shows the absolute change
of the voters’ utility due to a marginal increase in the number of informed voters. For these
newly informed citizens a1
∂C∗N (X)
∂X , the utility component αX newly appears after advertising.
The slope of the new utility function of the voters VN (X,CN (X)) depends on the NGOs’
equilibrium contributions C∗N (X). Thus, the NGOs cannot design a contribution schedule that
gives no extra utility to the government. Again, the concept of truthful contribution schedules
is used. For all positive contributions, the marginal change in contributions has to reflect the
NGOs’ willingness to pay for the policy change: ∂CN (X)∂X = piN for all X where CN (X) > 0, given
a target utility UN . The minimal utility level they have to get to be exactly indifferent between
advertising and not advertising is UN (X) ≥ UN = piNX∗I . In general, UN ≥ piNX∗I . Thus, the
23Given piI and assuming that I is restricted to truthful contribution schedules C
∗
I (X) = max{piNX −UI ; 0},
X∗I is derived a condition similar to propositon 1:
∂G(X,CI (X)
∂X
= ∂U(T−X)
∂X
+ a0α+ piI . As I is the only lobby, UI
is now defined by G(X∗; {C∗I (X∗, UI)}) ≥ maxX∈X G(X; 0).
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compensating contribution schedule of the NGOs is C∗N (X) = max{piNX − UN ; 0}. When the
NGOs are the only lobby X∗I is substituted by X
∗
nl. It is useful to state:
Lemma 5. The voters’ utility function VN (X) when the NGOs lobby by advertising and are
restricted to truthful contribution schedules has a unique global maximum.
Proof. See appendix. 
For the second stage of the political process, the policy implementation equilibrium becomes:
Corollary 1. For each piI and each piN > 0, a0, a1 and α, there exists a unique equilibrium
[X∗; {C∗k(X∗, Uk)}] if and only if:
X∗ = argmaxG = argmax[C∗I (X
∗, U I)+(Y −T )+U(T −X)+(a0+a1C∗N (X∗, UN ))αX] (14)
such that Uk(X,Ck) ≥ Uk and with C∗I ∈ C fulfilling
G(X∗; {C∗k(X∗, Uk)}) ≥ max
X∈X
VN (X; (C∗N (X
∗, Uk); 0)) (15)
Proof. See appendix. 
The main results, namely that a failure to compromise in the policy choice stage yields low
implementation results also holds for asymmetric lobbying. Yet, for this case, it no longer true
that
∑
k pik determines the equilibrium outcome of the implementation level. Therefore, it is
useful to state the results for the case with similar lobbying interests:
Corollary 2. For all pik which satisfy sgn[pi
j
I ] = sgn[pi
j
N ], j ∈ {e, c}, and with sk ≥ 0, and
τ ∈]0; 1], it is always true that piek < pick and X∗e < X∗c .
Compared to the no-lobby implementation level X∗nl (see equation 5), and assuming pi
e
k, pi
c
k 6= 0,
the outcome depends on the category of the policy issue:
• Case 1: If sk ≥ τ28 , X∗e < X∗c < X∗nl where only I lobbies and pijI < 0
• Case 2: If τ29 < sk < τ
2
8 , X
∗
e < X
∗
nl < X
∗
c where only I lobbies in equilibrium as pi
e
k < 0
and both lobbies are active under collusion as pick > 0
• Case 3: If sk ≤ τ29 , X∗nl < X∗e < X∗c where both lobbies are active and pijI > 0
Proof. See appendix. 
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Also when the NGOs lobby by advertising, low implementation results from a failure to
compromise in the policy choice stage. However, now the low policy outcomes do not lie in the
responsibility of the NGOs: As they are restricted to use informative advertising, they become
the advocates of public opinion. The implementation level is only lowered by the lobbying effort
of the industry. This result is discussed from the normative point of view in section 4.2.
With an asymmetry in lobbying channels, it is interesting to ask when one lobbying channel
is more effective than the other. This is especially relevant for a situation where the interest
groups can strategically choose which lobbying channel they want to use. (The possibility that
both channels can be used simultaneously is excluded in this model.) For a better view on
the relative effectiveness of the two lobbying methods, consider the following special case where
lobbies have opposite directions of their lobbying interests:
Proposition 5. Let |piI | = |piN | and piI < 0 and piN > 0. Let lobby N use advertising.
Advertising is more effective than direct contributions if and only if
1
a1α
+
UN
piN
< 2X (16)
Proof. See appendix. 
When more citizens can be reached by an advertising campaign (higher a1) as well as when
voters are more altruistic (higher α), lobbying by advertising is more effective. When α is
higher, citizens respond more to the information about the new policy issue. The awareness in
the population of the need for political action is then higher. This means that for issues which
directly concern the citizens, such as environmental politics or consumer protection, advertising
will have more impact than in the case of foreign aid.24 Naturally, advertising is also more
effective, the lower the target utility level UN , as the NGOs then have more resources free for
advertising. When the lobbying interest piN , increases, this increases the effort or expenditures
CN = piNX −UN for advertising. Note that the effectiveness of advertising also depends on the
implementation level X: The higher the implementation level, the more effective is advertising.
The reason for that is the double effect of advertising. It not only marginally changes the welfare
function, but adds a new component to it for all marginally new informed citizens. The higher
24This result is similar to the one in Yu (2003).
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the level of X, the more weight is given to these additions to the welfare function. In which
area of X ∈ [0;T ] the advertising takes place, depends on the exact form of the voters’ utility
function V (X): The NGOs only advertise for UN ≥ piNX∗I . Condition 16 thus is valid only for
X ≥ X∗I . The higher X∗I , the higher will be the X and the more effective is advertising.
In the model, the industry could choose to use advertising if this channel proved to be more
effective. On the other hand, the NGOs are excluded from lobbying by direct contributions.
This means that an asymmetry of lobbying can result even if piN > 0. When advertising is the
less effective lobbying channel or whenever piN < 0, the NGOs have a disadvantage from not
using direct political contributions. Yet, casual evidence seems to suggest that especially civil
rights groups prefer advertising or even restrict themselves not to use political contributions.
One reason could be their lack of resources. Yet, if there are no fixed costs for lobbying by
contributions, this is no valid explanation. If empirical evidence proves that some groups commit
to lobby only by advertising, a closer analysis for the reasons of this choice would be worthwhile.
4.2. Lobbying and the voters’ utility. So far, the model has not made any normative as-
sessments. In particular with asymmetric lobbying, however, it would be interesting to see the
implications of different lobbying channels for the utility of the general public. This can yield
some policy implications as to which lobbying channels should be supported or controlled more
than others. To evaluate the political process, the equilibrium outcome has to be compared to
some benchmark. For the purpose of describing democratic political processes, the adequate
benchmark seems to be the utility of the voters. Note that the model does not yield explicit
welfare results: Instead of welfare, it considers the utility of the representative voter. Never-
theless, this can capture how lobbying distorts the policy implementation level with respect to
the level desired by the public. How does the implementation outcome X∗e from the political
process compare to the implementation outcome which maximizes the utility of the citizens?
The benchmark X∗opt is defined by taking into account that citizens get some utility from the
policy compromise, even though they may not be aware of that (a0 is set equal to 1):
X∗opt = argmax[(Y − T ) + αX + U(T −X)] (17)
Then, the outcome from the political process compares to the optimum as follows:
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Proposition 6. Whenever pik < 0 for at least one k, X∗e < X∗opt.
When pik > 0 ∀k, direct political contributions can lead to too little or too much implementation.
In the limit, lobbying by advertising yields the benchmark case.
Proof. See appendix. 
In connection with advertising, welfare considerations, even in this reduced form, are prob-
lematic. The preferences of the citizens are influenced by advertising. In this model, the NGOs
advertise by information. Advertising messages cannot convince the voters that there is no need
for the new policy. Still, in most cases, a fraction of the population remains uninformed and thus
unaware of their utility from an implementation of the new policy. Is it then possible to judge
whether the utility function after advertising reflects the “true” utility? In modern democracies,
where the population is the sovereign, the decision of which policies are desirable for the society
is left to the citizens. Who would then be in the position to judge whether the citizens are
informed enough to know their true preferences?
Considering this, instead of the benchmark that considers the altruism of the citizens even
when they themselves are unaware of it, a less idealistic point of reference could be the utility
function of the citizens after the advertising campaign. This would give lobbying by advertising
a welfare-neutral role: All implementation outcomes without direct lobbying contributions, that
is, without distortions to the welfare considerations of the government, are then ex-post welfare-
maximizing. Policy implications are discussed in the next section.
5. Policy implications
The involvement of lobbies in the political process can lead to lower government action than
is desired by the voters. Therefore, there is room for improvements of the political process.
5.1. Design of the political process. When interest groups are involved in the political
decision-making process, both at the policy choice and the policy implementation stage, they
have a very high influence on the overall policy outcome. Their failure to agree on political
strategies then leads to an overall low level of government action. Even when all groups of
society are represented in interest groups, this result would not change: As proved by Bernheim
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and Whinston (1986), the policy implementation outcome would then be socially efficient given
the lobbying incentives defined in the policy choice stage. Because of the failure to compromise
in the first stage, however, these lobbying incentives would be inefficiently low.
It could therefore be beneficial to exclude the lobbies from the first stage of the decision-
making process. This partial ban on corporatism would mean that the government chooses
the political strategy free from the pressure of lobbies. The resulting policy could be more
encompassing. The dynamics of the policy choice which lead to very weak policy compromises
would be circumvented. On the other hand, an official ban on corporatism may lead to less
transparency, as the lobbies resort to direct political contributions to shape the compromise
according to their interests. In the implementation stage, this can move the outcome away from
the outcome that is desired by the general public. An institutionalized corporatism should be
based on public pressure. This can only be achieved by officially acknowledging interest groups
as important political agents.
5.2. Ex-ante compromise. One result of the model is that the “collusive” policy compromise
leads to higher policy implementation level than in equilibrium. Yet, in the policy choice game,
this alone does not help to support collusion. Interest groups have an incentive to deviate from
the collusive strategy. That overall gains are reduced by this behavior does not change the
commitment problem. In the implementation stage, there is no punishment for a deviation from
collusion. Quite to the contrary, the deviator shapes the outcome of stage two and gets an
additional surplus. The government could implement a different set of rules for the decision-
making process. Collusion can be sustained only if interest groups are punished for deviating.
Repeated interaction could be one solution to this problem. The government could also give
incentives for the interest groups to co-ordinate in advance. This model does not develop such a
solution. With respect to possible improvements of political decision-making processes, further
investigation of this question would be worthwhile.
5.3. The case of access to medicines. Why have western governments not reacted more
actively to the health crisis in developing countries? Surveys (Olsen(2000)) show that in most
industrialized countries there is a significant public interest in foreign aid. In most countries,
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there exist both political institutions concerned with development assistance and several non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that promote the case of access for medicines. This shows
that there is the expertise to draft effective strategies and to implement such policies. Inter-
national organizations, interest groups, and scientists have proposed possible solutions. An
example is the DEFEND proposal (Ganslandt, Maskus, Wong (2001)). The authors propose a
fund to compensate the pharmaceutical industry for R&D and low-price sales of medicines.25
In the ongoing political debates, such as the “Civil Society” meetings of the EU Commission,
one can identify several characteristics.26 These meetings were attended by associations of the
research-based as well as the generic pharmaceutical industry and some of the most active NGOs
(Participants there include MSF, OXFAM, AIM and others). Generally, all interest groups, the
pharmaceutical industry as well as the NGOs involved, and the EU Commission, agreed on the
need for immediate action.
Concerning the political strategy, the proposals had very different potentials for compromise.
For example, short-term donations of limited amounts of drugs, and trade measures, such as
lower tariffs or agreements for a transfer of technology were rather low-conflict points. Funda-
mental conflict developed concerning the protection of intellectual property rights, where NGOs
frequently blamed the industry of profiting from excessively strong patent rights. Also differ-
ential pricing and parallel import of drugs (importing copy-drugs into a country with patent
protection) were among the controversial issues. Ethical and human rights’ questions which
are relevant for the issue of health further complicated the situation. The NGOs accused the
industry of neglecting these aspects. They perceived the chance of compromise to be very low.27
Conflict over access to medicines thus has evolved on several levels: On the one hand, there
is an ideological level. The NGOs generally refuse to support measures where the industry is
compensated because they blame it to be responsible for the crisis. This leads to conflicts on
25Suggestions can also be found in the working paper series of the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health: Kremer (2001) gives an overview over possible policies.
26Agendas and reports for these meetings can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade /csc/issuegr.htm.
27An illustration for the tense atmosphere in those meetings can be found in a quote from one of
the discussion reports: “Dialogue between the industry and certain NGOs was not always easy.”, see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/rephealth05a.htm, version 14/03/2002.
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other levels, where technical problems have to be solved. For example, the interest groups were
not able to agree on the use of the WHO-list of the most essential drugs for developing countries.
These meetings can be evaluated in terms of the political decision-making model. The level
of conflict seems to be sufficiently high to give the lobbies negative equilibrium gains from the
policy compromise. This can be the reason why they lobby against the implementation of the
new strategy. This leads to a lower than status-quo level of government action.
5.4. Changing the lobbies’ attitude. Recently, governments have started policy projects
to alleviate the health crisis in developing countries. This policy change coincides with an
intensified discussion of the issue which has also found a large echo in the media. In the model,
one way to achieve a higher level of government action is to increase the perception of the ex-
ante probability of compromise. This gives the lobbies a higher interest in the actual policy
implementation. Public discussions as well as the dissemination of objective information about
an issue, for example by publications by independent experts, could achieve this change in
perception. Here, the independent media play an important role (see Baron (2003)).
A big problem are the lobbies’ status-quo biases: Especially when the former policy has been
very advantageous for them, they will not be in favor of the implementation of a new policy
compromise. When the government is dependent on the lobbies’ support for the implementation
of a new policy, it could therefore try to reduce their stakes in the old policy by creating
disadvantages for companies which are opposed to change. A way to achieve this is public
pressure. A good example are the recent campaigns which put moral pressure on pharmaceutical
companies, arguing that they would protect their patents by sacrificing human lives. This led
several companies to offer a large amount of AIDS medicines for free.28
5.5. Advertising. In many political issue areas, interest groups are not symmetric. One side,
usually the industry, has capital and can offer other advantages, such as attractive positions.
Most interest groups opposing the industry have a civil society origin. They are citizen initiatives,
created in order to bring policy outcomes closer to the needs of the citizens. These groups
usually do not have the resources or the structure to use the classical lobbying channel of
28An overview of industry initiatives is given by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Associations, http : //www.efpia.org/4pos/access/Inventory%20May2002.doc, version 12/09/2002
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direct contributions. A second reason for NGOs not to use direct political contributions is
ideological: Often, those movements are created out of a general discontent with the current
political process. Their ideology prescribes certain channels by which political influence can be
used without destroying democratic values. As direct political contributions, even when they do
not involve illegal bribes, are characterized by a lack of transparency, NGOs refrain from using
them even if they had the resources to do so.
Proposition 6 shows that a political process that relies on advertising as a lobbying channel
can be expected to lead to an outcome closer to the benchmark than with direct lobbying
contributions. Nevertheless, in most cases, government action will be too low. If the weaker
benchmark of the voters’ utility after advertising is taken, all implementation outcomes where
only advertising is used are optimal, even when they are lower than the status-quo level. In
these cases, only direct political contributions distort the outcome. Naturally, lobbying by
influencing public opinion is less distorting when the benchmark considers the utility of the
general public. Such a benchmark seems to be apt for modern western democracies where no
party or decision maker can claim to know the “true” best policy. (This might be different
for other political regimes.) Lobbies that use advertising act as advocates of the citizens: By
aiming at the public opinion, they can give more decision-making power to the constituents. The
policy choice then is closer to the preferences of the general public. This is a role most NGOs are
claiming for themselves. In many cases, their civil rights’ origin gives this claim some legitimacy.
When interest groups shape public opinion, they constitute an essential part of democracy. In
Germany, for example, the duty to inform and create public opinion is explicitly assigned to
political parties. Interest groups can be an important supplement and corrective in this respect.
The results imply that influencing public opinion should be made a more effective lobbying
channel than direct political contributions. This could be achieved by creating more trans-
parency in political institutions. Increased publicity of a subject could trigger the orientation
towards more information-oriented lobbying. After access to medicines has increasingly been
covered in the media, the recent strategy of some pharmaceutical companies to donate medicines
against HIV/AIDS accompanied by a big public-relations campaign is a move in this direction.
In countries with a transparent government, where direct political contributions are difficult and
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less effective, the utility of the population is more readily taken into account even when policies
are shaped by lobbies. This is true even when not all citizens are organized. The model thus
provides an argument for increased democratization and for the demands for transparency in
current democratic governments.
6. Conclusion
The paper describes the process of the definition and implementation of a political strategy.
When interest groups are involved in both stages of a political decision-making process, they
have significant influence on the policy implementation outcome. Policies are classified in several
categories, depending on the ex-ante perception for the chance of a compromise and the lobbies’
status-quo biases. If a policy question is perceived as very controversial, the influence of lobbies
reduces policy implementation even if they did not benefit a lot from the status-quo policy. Policy
implications include a change in the perception of controversial policy issues and the reduction
of the status-quo biases of the lobbies. Furthermore, governments should not integrate interest
groups too early in the decision-making process. More transparency in political institutions can
give stronger incentives to interest groups to lobby by shaping public opinion.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. The utility function of the voters is defined by
V (X) = (Y − T ) + U(T −X) + a0αX
with U(0) = 0, UX < 0, and UXX < 0, continuous and twice differentiable. Also, limX→0UX = 0
and limX→TUX = −∞. The first-order condition for a maximum is
∂V
∂X
=
∂U(T −X)
∂(T −X)
∂(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α = 0
With ∂(T−X)∂X = −1 and the assumptions on U(X), we get that
∂U(T −X)
∂(T −X) = −
∂U(T −X)
∂X
= a0α
is fulfilled by a unique X∗ for each parameter constellation. For a global maximum, the second
order condition is
∂2V
(∂X)2
=
∂2U(T −X)
(∂X)2
< 0
This is fulfilled by the assumption UXX < 0 ∀X. 
7.2. Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. The proof for existence and uniqueness of the second-stage equilibrium [X∗; {C∗k(X∗, U∗k )}],
follows the standard proof in the literature (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 2001, Chpt. 7). First,
consider the lobbies’ problem: When the lobbies are constrained to use truthful contribution
schedules, the marginal change of their contribution Ck(X) with respect to a change in X has
to reflect their marginal change in utility:
∂Ck
∂X
= −
∂Uk
∂X
∂Uk
∂Ck
= − pik−1 = pik
For pik > 0, contributions grow with a higher level of policy implementation. When pik < 0, the
lobby would like to see less policy implementation. Contributions increase with a lower X.
Using these truthful contribution schedules, it can be shown that the government objective
function G({Ck(X)}, X) has a global maximum for each parameter constellation and marginal
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lobbying interests pik. The first-order condition for the government is given by
∂G
∂X
=
∂CI
∂X
+
∂CN
∂X
+
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α = 0.
The marginal lobbying contributions can now be substituted into the first-order condition for
the government:
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α = −(piI + piN )⇔ ∂V (X)
∂X
= −(piI + piN )
With Lemma 1, V (X) has a unique global maximum when there is no lobbying. Call that
equilibrium X∗nl (no lobby). V (X) is increasing for all X < X
∗
nl and decreasing for all X >
X∗nl. With lobbying contributions, the first-order condition for the government is changed: For
(piI + piN ) > 0, ∂V∂X has to be negative in equilibrium.
∂V
∂X is monotonously decreasing in X (see
Lemma 1). Therefore, it must hold that the new equilibrium is unique and that X∗ > X∗nl. A
similar argumentation holds for (piI + piN ) < 0.
The set of equilibrium lobbying contributions is constrained by the requirement of truthful
equilibria where each lobby has to get the utility level Uk defined by condition 8: In order to
induce the government to follow its interests, each lobby has to make the government at least
as well off as it would be if only the other lobby was contributing. 
7.3. Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. The first order conditions of this problem lead to linear reaction functions of the form:
RI =
τ −RN
2
;RN =
τR0 −RI
2
For τ > 0 this leads to a unique, positive, internal solution: |ReI | = ReN = τ3 . Second order
conditions are fulfilled. The government can apply this mechanism without further restrictions,
as τ ≥ (RI +RN ) always holds. 
7.4. Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. Take the first-order condition of Proposition 1. By comparing the first derivatives of the
government objective function, the implementation levels X∗e , X∗c and X∗nl can be ranked.
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Equilibrium and collusion implementation levels X can be found using the following first
derivative of the government objective function, substituting {pij} with j ∈ {e, c}:
∂G
∂X
= pijI + pi
j
N +
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α
From Lemma 3 it follows that piek < pi
c
k for both negative and positive values of pik. So pi
c
k can
be expressed by piek + . Look at the first-order conditions for the maximization problem of the
government for pie and pic respectively:
∂G(Xe)
∂X
= 0⇔ a0α+ ∂U(T −X)
∂X
= −(pieI + pieN )
and
∂G(Xc)
∂X
= 0⇔ a0α+ ∂U(T −X)
∂X
= −(pieI + + picN + )
With Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, G is a continuous function with a unique maximum X∗ for
each parameter constellation. With  > 0, and UXX < 0 ∀X, it must be that X∗e and X∗c exist
and are unique. Furthermore, −(pieI + pieN ) > −(picI + picN ) as 0 > −2 and therefore X∗c > X∗e .
With respect to X∗nl, a similar argument can be used. The first-order condition for the status-
quo level of policy implementation X∗nl is given by condition 5 as
∂G(Xnl)
∂X
= 0⇔ a0α+ ∂U(T −X)
∂X
= 0
With respect to the conditions above, the only difference is the sum of marginal contributions
(pijI + pi
j
N ). G is a continuous function with a unique maximum X
∗ for each parameter constel-
lation. With UXX < 0 ∀X, the slope of G is monotonously decreasing with X. Thus,
X∗j
{
< X∗nl if and only if (pi
j
I + pi
j
N ) < 0,
> X∗nl otherwise.
For the rest of the proof, use the results of lemma 4: If and only if piek and pi
c
k are positive,
X∗nl < X
∗
e < X
∗
c (case 1). If and only if pi
c
k > 0 and pi
e
k < 0, X
∗
e < X
∗
nl < X
∗
c (case 2). If and
only if pijk < 0, X
∗
e < X
∗
c < X
∗
nl (case 3).
To relate the requirement of (pijI + pi
j
N ) < 0 to the parameters τ and sk, use lemma 4:
• Case 1: (pijI + pijN ) < 0 if
∑
k sk >
∑
k uk = 2
τ2
8 =
τ2
4
• Case 2: (pieI + pieN ) < 0 < (picI + picN ) if 2τ
2
9 <
∑
k sk <
τ2
4
• Case 3: (pijI + pijN ) > 0 If
∑
k sk <
∑
k uk = 2
τ2
9

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7.5. Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. For this proof, piN > 0 is assumed. Let X∗nl be the unique equilibrium policy choice
of the government without lobbying (see lemma 1). When the NGOs are the only lobby and
are constrained to truthful contribution schedules, we get as the first-order condition for the
government’s maximization problem
∂VN (X,CN (X))
∂X
=
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α+ a1α(2piNX − UN ) = 0
where C∗N (X) = max{piNX − UN , 0}, and UN ≥ piNX∗nl. When we assume piN > 0, we expect
the NGOs to increase the policy choice of the government, otherwise, it would fare better if it
were not lobbying. Therefore, VN (X) = V (X) when X < UNpiN .
Note that U(0) = 0, UX < 0, and UXX < 0, continuous and twice differentiable and
limX→0UX = 0 and limX→TUX = −∞. With the other terms constant or linearly increas-
ing in X and bounded by the requirement that X ≤ T , there must be a unique X∗N that fulfills
this first-order condition.
It now remains to be shown that VN (X∗) is the maximum of VN (X,CN (X)). This is the case
when ∂VN (X,CN (X))∂X > 0 for X < X
∗ and ∂VN (X,CN (X))∂X < 0 for X > X
∗. With the monotonicity
assumption on UX(T −X), UXX < 0, this follows directly.
Furthermore, for advertising to be effective, it must hold that X∗N > X
∗
nl. By comparing the
first-order condition of the government’s maximization problem to the condition in lemma 1, we
see that this is the case if a1α(2piNX − UN ) > 0. The lower bound for X is given by X ≥ UNpiN .
Plugging that in, we get a1α(2UN − UN ) > 0. This is always fulfilled. Thus, X∗N > X∗nl
holds. 
7.6. Proof of Corollary 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1. The only difference is the changed
maximization problem of the government, as the lobbying contributions of the NGOs directly
enter the utility function of the voters. Note that throughout, piN > 0 is assumed. For piN < 0,
we are back to proposition 1. When we assume that the NGOs stay out of the lobbying game,
the policy choice is shaped only by the lobbying activity of the industry. The policy choice that
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results when only the industry is lobbying is given by X∗I = argmax[CI(X) + V (X)]. X
∗
I is
existing and unique, see proposition 1.
With the requirement of truthful equilibria, we again get the condition for the marginal
lobbying contributions of both lobbies ∂Ck∂X = pik. In lemma 5, it has been shown that the
maximization problem of the government has a unique maximum when only the NGOs are
lobbying. It remains to be shown that the same holds true when the industry is included in the
lobbying game. In order to make the NGOs at least indifferent between lobbying and staying out
of the lobbying game, the lobby has to be given a minimal utility level: UN (X) ≥ UN = piNX∗I .
The compensating contribution schedule of the NGOs is again C∗N (X) = max{piNX − UN , 0}
∀X ≥ UNpiN and 0 otherwise.
The first-order condition for a global maximum of G(X) is given by
∂G
∂X
= 0⇔ ∂VN (X,CN (X))
∂X
= −∂CI
∂X
= −piI
or
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α+ a1α(2piNX − UN ) = −piI
With lemma 5 and piI constant, there must be a unique X∗ that fulfills this condition. The
equilibrium lobbying contribution for the NGOs then is C∗N (X
∗) = piNX∗ − UN . For the
industry, the equilibrium lobbying contributions have to fulfill condition 15. The industry’s
target utility level U I is defined by the requirement that it leaves the government indifferent
between maximizing VN (X) or accepting the contribution and choosing the implementation level
preferred by the industry. 
7.7. Proof of Corollary 2.
Proof. In lemma 5, it has been shown that the maximization problem of the government has a
unique maximum for each parameter constellation. It is straightforward that a change in piI has
the same effects on X∗ as in the case with symmetric lobbying: Whenever piN < 0, the industry
is the only lobby and the proof of proposition 4 applies. For the case where piN > 0, lemma 5
shows that VN (X) has a similar behavior to V (X): Thus, it is not possible that lobbying by
advertising reverts the impact of piN or piI with respect to the results in proposition 4. Consider
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again the first-order condition for the maximization problem of the government when piN > 0:
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a0α+ a1α(2piNX − UN ) = −piI
When piN increases, the left hand side of the first-order condition increases for all X. Remember
that UXX < 0. The equilibrium value X∗ thus has to increase with piN . When piI > 0, this
further increases X∗. For piI < 0, X∗ is decreased. The mechanism is equal to the one proved in
proposition 4. To see the categorization of policy issues, take pik = uk − sk where piek = τ
2
9 − sk
and piek =
τ2
8 − sk:
• Case 1: If sk ≥ τ28 , pijI < 0
• Case 2: If τ29 < sk < τ
2
8 , pi
e
k < 0 and pi
c
k > 0
• Case 3: If sk ≤ τ29 , pijI > 0

7.8. Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. The proof focusses only on the implementation level X∗. It considers only condition 14
and omits all other equilibrium conditions concerning the optimal lobbying contributions C∗k .
Given |piI | = |piN | and sgn[pik] 6= sgn[pil], let piI < 0 and piN > 0. Consider the first-order
condition for the problem of the government and substitute |piI | with piN :
a0α+
∂U(T −X)
∂X
= −a1α(2piNX − UN ) + piN
When the right hand side is negative, advertising has a higher impact on the equilibrium policy
implementation level than direct contributions as then X∗ > X∗nl. The condition for that is
piN < a1α(2piNX − UN )⇔ 1
a1α
+
UN
piN
< 2X
This is the condition for the relative effectiveness of the different lobbying channels. 
7.9. Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. In proposition 4 it is shown that the equilibrium policy implementation level decreases
with respect to X∗nl whenever pi
e
k < 0, k = {I,N}. The first order condition for X∗opt is given by
α+
∂U(T −X)
∂X
= 0
as a0 < 1, it must be that X∗opt > X∗nl (see lemma 1). This proves the first part of proposition 6.
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Next, it is shown that for pik > 0, advertising can in the limit yield the equilibrium outcome
X∗ = X∗opt. Consider again the first-order condition for the maximization problem of the
government with pik > 0:
a0α+
∂U(T −X)
∂X
+ a1α(2piNX − UN ) = −piI
Lobbying by direct political contributions could lead to too much implementation, as the con-
tributions outweigh the government’s concern for the utility of the voters: A large piI increases
the resulting policy implementation level. If in the extreme both interest groups used direct
political contributions for lobbying and only a very small part of the population was informed,
the government would decide the implementation level almost exclusively considering the con-
tributions of the lobbies. This follows directly from proposition 1. The resulting implementation
choice could then well be X∗ > X∗opt.
In contrast to that, lobbying by advertising can never lead to results where X∗ > X∗opt:
In the limit, a(CN (X)) = 1. Then, we are back to the condition for X∗opt. As a(CN (X)) is
monotonously increasing with CN (X), the limit case is also the case where the government
puts the highest weight on the citizens’ utility from the implementation of the new policy
αa(CN (X))X. Lower a(CN (X)) must thus always yield X∗ < X∗opt. 
References
[1] Aidt, T., 1998. Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy. Journal of
Public Economics 69, 1-16.
[2] Alesina, A., 1994. Political Models of Macroeconomic Policy and Fiscal Reforms. In: Haggard, S. , Webb,
S. (eds.), 1994. Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment, Oxford
University Press, New York, 37-60
[3] Alesina, A., Dollar, D., 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?. Journal of Economic Growth
5(1), 33-63
[4] Alesina, A., Drazen, A., 1991. Why are stabilizations delayed?. American Economic Review 81(5), 1170-1188
[5] Austen-Smith, D., 1987. Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and Probabilistic Voting. Public Choice
54, 123-139
[6] Baron, D., 2003. Competing For the Public through the News Media. Stanford Research Paper No. 1808
[7] Bennedsen, M., Feldman, S.E., 2003. Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions. mimeo
Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia 36
[8] Bennedsen, M., Feldman, S.E., 2002. Lobbying Legislatures. Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 919-946
[9] Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M., 1986a. Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31
[10] Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M., 1986b. Common Agency. Econometrica 54(4), 923-942
[11] Besley, T., Coate, S., 2001. Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy. Review of Economic
Studies 86, 67-82
[12] Bloch, F., Manceau, D., 1999. Persuasive Advertising in Hotelling’s Model of Product Differentiation. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 17, 557-574
[13] Burnside, C., Dollar, D., 2000. Aid, Policies, and Growth. American Economic Review 90(4), 847-868
[14] Coate, S., 2001. Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising. NBER
working paper 8693
[15] Coate, S., Morris, S., 1999. Policy Persistence. American Economic Review, 89(5), 1327-1336
[16] Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1999. Advocates. Journal of Political Economy 107(1), 1-39
[17] Dixit, A., 1996. Special Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation. Eastern Economic Journal
22, 375-388
[18] Dixit, A., Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E., 1997. Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and
Application to Government Policy Making. Journal of Political Economy 105(4), 752-769
[19] Drazen, A., Lima˜o, N., 2003. Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient
Redistribution Policies. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4007
[20] Epstein, G. S., Nitzan, S., 2004. Strategic Restraint in Contests. forthcoming in: European Economic Review
[21] Epstein, G.S., Nitzan, S., 2002. Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests. Public Choice 112, 137-142
[22] Felli, L., Merlo, A., 2000. Endogenous Lobbying. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 291
[23] Fernandez, R., Rodrik, D., 1991. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific
Uncertainty. American Economic Review 81(5), 1146- 1155
[24] Fredriksson, P. G., Svensson, J., 2003. Political Instability, Corruption and Policy Formation: the Case of
Environmental Policy. Journal of Public Economics 87, 1383-1405
[25] EU-Commission, 2001. Reports from issue-group meetings at the European Commission, publicly available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade /csc/issuegr.htm, version of the 14.03.2002
[26] Ganslandt, M., Maskus, K.E., Wong, E.V., 2001. Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor
Countries: The DEFEND Proposal. The World Economy 24(6), 779-795
[27] Gawande, K., 1997. US Non-Tariff Barriers as Privately Provided Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics
64, 61-81
37 Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia
[28] Gersbach, H., Liessem, V., 2002. Financing Democracy. CESifo Working Paper No. 821
[29] Greenwood, J., 1997, Representing Interests in the European Union. St. Martin’s Press, New York
[30] Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., 2001. Special Interest Politics. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
[31] Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., 1999. Competing for Endorsements. American Economic Review 89(3),
501-524
[32] Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., 1996. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics. Review of Economic
Studies 63, 265 - 286
[33] Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., 1994. Protection for Sale. American Economic Review 84 (4), 833-850
[34] Kirchsteiger, G., Prat, A., 2001. Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying. Journal of Public Economics 82, 349-375
[35] Kremer, M., 2001. Public Policies to Stimulate the Developjment of Vaccines and Drugs for the Neglected
Diseases. CMH working paper series, WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
[36] Lahiri, S., Raimondos-Moeller, P., 2000. Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation. The Economic
Journal 110, 62-79
[37] Le Breton, M., Salanie, F., 2003. Lobbying under Political Uncertainty. Journal of Public Economics 87,
2589-2610
[38] Magee, Ch., 2002. Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation: An Application to the Free-Rider Prob-
lem. Journal of International Economics 57, 449-471
[39] Marceau, N., Smart, M., 2003. Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation. American
Economic Review 93(1), 241-251
[40] Mayer, W., Raimondos-Moeller, P., 2003. The Politics of Foreign Aid: A Median Voter Perspective. Review
of Development Economics 7(2), 165-178
[41] Mitra, D., 1999. Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade-
Policy Determination. American Economic Review 89(5), 1116-1134
[42] Mosley, P., 1996. The Failure of Aid and Adjustment Policies in Sub Saharan Africa: Counter-Examples and
Policy Proposals. Journal of African Economics 5 (3), 406- 443
[43] Olsen, G.R., 2000. Public Opinion and Development Aid: Is there a Link? CDR Working Paper 00.9
[44] Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
[45] Persson, T., 1998. Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics. Economic Journal 108(447), 310-327
[46] Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1994. Does Centralization Increase the Size of the Government? European Eco-
nomic Review 38, 765-773
Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia 38
[47] Potters, J., Sloof R., van Winden, F., 1997. Campaign Expenditure, Contributions and Direct Endorsements:
The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior. European Journal of Political
Economy 13, 1-31
[48] Prat, A., 2002a. Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies.
Journal of Economic Theory 103, 162-189
[49] Prat, A., 2002b. Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare. Review of Economic Studies 69, 999-1017
[50] Putnam, R.D., 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Orga-
nization 42(3), 427-460
[51] Rama, M., Tabellini, G., 1998. Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies.
European Economic Review 42, 1295-1316
[52] Risse-Kappen, T., 1991. Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.
World Politics 43(4), 479-512
[53] Romer, D., 2003. Misconceptions and Political Outcomes. Economic Journal 113, 1-20
[54] Sikkink, K., 1993. Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America. International
Organization 47(3), 411-441
[55] Svensson, J., 2000a. Foreign Aid and Rent-seeking. Journal of International Economics 51, 437461
[56] Svensson, J., 2000b. When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality. Journal of
Development Economics 61, 61-84
[57] Therien, J.-P., Noel, A., 2000. Political Parties and Foreign Aid. American Political Science Review 94(1),
151-162
[58] Yu, Zihao, 2003. Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political
Influence. forthcoming in: The Review of Economic Studies
